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STATIJTES 1.ND CONGTITUTIONAL

PROVISIOl'lS
Burns Ind. Stat. Ann. ,510•!t~33 (1970 Supp.)
"It shall be a misdemeanor for any person to refuse to leave the
premises of any institution established ·for the purpose of the education
of students enrolled therein when so requested, regardless of the
reason, by the duly constituted offielals of any such institution.
[Acts 1969, ch. 179, 53, p. li57.Ju
Burns !nd. Stat. Ann. §.10•·4535 (1970 Su~:e,.)
A person ·who commits a misde!!leanor defined in this act [5610..453110-4536] shall be punished upon conviction, by a fine of not to eJ:ceed
five hundred dollars [$500] or by imprisonment £or not to exceed six
[61 months, or by both fine and imprisonment. [Acts 1969, ch. 179,
f5, p. 457. J"
0

Relevant portions of the Constitution of the Ctate of Indiana are as
follows:
Article!, Section 9 - ''No law shall be passed, restraining the
free interchange of thou8ht and opinion, or restricting the right to
speak, write, or print, freely, on any subject whatever: but for the
abuse of that right, every peraon shall be respoosible.n
Article!, Section 12 - "All courts shall be open; and every
man, for injury done to him in his person, property, or reputation,
shall have remedy by due course of law. Justice shall be administered
freely, and without purchase; coropletely, and without denial; speedily,
and without delay. 11
Article I, Sect ion 13 - "In all criminal prosecutions, the acc:u~e~l
shall have the right to a public trial,, by an impartial jury, in the
county in which the offense shall have been committed; to be heard by
himself and counsel;{to demand the nature and cause of the accusation
against him and to have a copy thereof;)to meet the witnesses face to
face, and to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor."
Article I, Section 31 • "No lav shall restrain any of the inhabi ..
tants of the State from assembling together in a peaceable manner, to
consult for their common good; nor from instructing their representa•
tives; nor from applying to the General Assembly for redress of grievances.'
Relevant portions of the Constitution of the United States of America
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are as follows:
Amendment l - "Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
abridging the freedom. of speech, or of the press; or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for
a redress of grievances."
Amendment 14 - 11All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the
United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any per•
son of life, liberty, or property, ·without due process of law; nor
deny to any person ·within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the latis."

3

ISSUE PP.ESEl~ED ON APPEAL
t-Jhether Burns Ind. 3tat. Ann. ~10•4533 (1 970 Supp.) is unconstitu..
tional and void on its face for vagueness and overbreadth in violation of
the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States
of America.

4

STATEt1E't-1'I OF THE CA!::E
This is a joint appeal from criminal convictions based upon refusal to
leave the premises of an educational institution upon the request of campus
police officers.
The appellants were arrested on the campus of Indiana University (Bloomington) on January 20, 1970, and charged separately with violations of Burns
Ind. Stat. Ann. ~lO-L1533 (Supp. 1970) (hereinafter cited as Section 10-4533).
The statute is reproduced on-page 1, supra.

-

At the time of their arrests,

both- of the appellants were students at Indiana University.
!n an affidavit filed on January 22, 1S70, in the Monroe Circuit Court,

r..obert Grody was charged as fol101-1s:
"William G. Spannuth being duly suorn, on his oath says that
Robert I. Grody on the 20th day of January, 1970, [in Monroe County,
Indiana1 did then and there refuse to leave the pLemises of an
institution established for the purpose of the education of
students enrolled therein, to Hit: the south-west door of the
India.na.·Mero.orial Union, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana.,
when requested to do so by duly appointed of~icials of Indiana
University, to l-,it: Captain Hilliam G. Spannuth, Indiana University
Safety Division, and Officer Austin Chord of the Indiana University
Safety Division . • . • " Record p. L
A similar charge was on the same date filed against Kerry Kaplan:
"Sgt. Norman Hard being duly sworn, on his oath says that
Kerry Kaplan on the 20th day of. January, 1970, fin Monroe County,
IndianaJ did then and there refuse to leave the premises of an
institution esta~lished for the purpose of the education of students
enrolled therein> to wit: the Indiana University Memorial UniQn,
Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana when requested to do so by
a duly appointed official of Indiana University, to ·wit: Sgt.
Norman Hard, Indiana University Safety Division . • • • " Record, p. 18.
On January 30, 1970, Grody and Kaplan filed separate and identical
motions to quash the affidavits with supPorting memoranda attached.
pp. 3-16, 20-33.

Record,

Both motions,araong other things, challenged the constitu~

tionality of Section 10-4533 on the grounds that it was vague and overly

5

broad,

These motions nere overruled by the Monroe Circuit Judge on 11.arch 24,

1~70.
Appellants entered pleas of not guilty on April 7, 1970, and their
cases were tried jointly on Nay 11, 1970.

At the completion of the evidence

the Circuit Judge took the matter under advisement, and on June 25, 1970,
announced his verdict finding the appellants guilty as charged and entering the :following judgment in each case:
"Comes nov the State of Indiana by its Pros. Attny and the Daft
appears in person and by counsel, }. Thoraas Schornhorst, and the
Court having heretofore taken the matter under advisement and being
duly advised in the premises nm, finds the Deft guilty as charged
in the affidavit herein end fixes for his punishment that he be fined
in the sum of $50,00 and the costs of this action.
"Deft is n0t·1 e;iven 60 days to pay his fine and costs of this action.
"The Court fixes t-.ppeal bond in the amount o f ~ -

JUDGHENT

Nat U. Hill, Judge
The trial judge did not include with his judgment any findings of fact
or interpretation of 3ection 10-4533.
On August 17, 1970, appellants filed jointly a motion to correct
errors contending that the trial judge had erred in overruling their
motions to quash and that their convictions were contrary to laa because
Section 10-4533 is unconstitutional on its face due to vagueness and overbreadth.

r..ecord, p. 36.

Attached to the motion was a memorandum of points

and authorities discussing the constitutional infirmities of Section 10-4533,
Record, pp. 39, 5-16, 22-33.

The same points had been raised in conjunction

·with the precedins motions to quash the affidavits.

Record, p. 39.

The trial court, ui.thout opinion, overruled the motion to correct errors
on September 14, 1970, and reduced the appeal bond in each case to $130.00.
Appellants posted their bonds within the time prescribed by the trial court
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and on Hovember 5, 1970, ::iled not:!.ce o:f appe,':1,l,

J.eco:cd pp. l}7-M',, 50-51.

The record of the p:coceedin3s uas :':ile,:1 :i.n the Indi.:'.'.n:!. :::upreme Court on
Decembe~ 10, 1970.
FACTS
Appellants present on appeal the single issue t·1hether Section 10-4533,
under which they were convicted and fined, is unconstitutional on its face.

All the facts necee~ary for this determination have been included in the
above statement of the case.
SUHHARY OF Ai.".GUMENT
Section 10-4533, which subjects to criminal punishment any person who
refuses to leave the premises of an educational institution when so requested by "duly constituted officials 11 regardless of the reason, is uncon•
stitutional on its face.
The language of the statute is so broad that it covers persons who are
exercising their rights of free speech and assembly pursuant to the guarantees of the First and Fourteenth .Amendments to the Constitution of the
United States

In addition, there are no standards provided in the statute

that would limit the exercise of administrative discretion and assure that
such power uould be exercised in an even-handed and non-discriminatory manner.
In effect, the statute delegates to administrators of educational institutions
(and, apparently, to campus police officers) the power to license and censor
free speech by students, teachers and all other visitors upon the property of
public universities and other educational institutions.

Time and again the

Supreme Court of the United States has struck down state laws that contained
similar standardless delegations of power.

7

The appellants have standing to challenge the constitutionality of
Section 10-4533 ·whether or not their particular conduct could be proscribed
by a properly drafted statute.

The chilling effect upon the free exercise

of 7irst Amendment rights produced by an overly broad statute requires
early intervention by the courts to preclude a denial of these rights to
others

Persons ought not to be subjected to the long~ costly and uncer-

tain process of litigation to determine whether their particular conduct
comes within the protection of the Constitution.

The responsibility is upon

the legislature to draft a statute that precludes such uncertaiDty.

More-

over, the statute at issue in the instant case is so broad that it is not
susceptible to a narrowing constitutional interpretatioD in a single case.
Even were such an interpretation possible, it would result in a completely
new statute that ·would, if applied to tlie appellants, be~ post facto.
Because of the overbreadth of Section 10-4533, men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.
Since the legislature cannot constitutionally delegate to administrators or
police officers the broad powers that are revealed by a literal reading of
the statute, there remains an unacceptable range of uncertainty as to the
lawful scope of such a delegation.

Since First Amendment rights are threatened

and chilled by such an uncertain and vague statute, it must be declared unconstitutional on its face.
Although the legislature has the power to protect public property and
to establish reasonable guidelines as to the time, place and manner of cer•
tain forms of expression, it may not seek to accomplish these legitimate goals
through unconstitutional means.

Moreover, there are ample legal means, ex-

cluding the catch-all provisions of Section 10-4533, through which the State's

8

interest in protecting educational institutions from unlawful disruption and
damage can be asserted.
Section 10-4533 should be declared unconstitutional and void on its face
for vagueness and overbreadth.
ABGU11ENT

I ..

SECTION 10-4533 lS UNCONSTITUTIONAL ON

1rs

FACE BECAUSE OF VAGUENESS

AND OVERBREADTH

A.

General Princi,Eles

Appellants recognize the general rule that statutes are presumed to be
constitutional and that doubts are to be resolved in favor of validity.
State v. Clark, (1966) 247 Ind. 490, 217 N.E.2d 503.

However, this general

rule must give way when a penal law cannot meet the constitutional require•
ments of specificity and permissible scope of application.

This is particularly

true where, as here, we are faced with nthe danger of tolerating, in the area .:
of First Amendment freedoms, the eKistence of a penal statute susceptible of
sweeping and im~roper application. 0

N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, (1963) 371 U.S.

415, 432-33, 03 S.Ct. 328, 9 L •. Ed •. 2d.405.
~-!2!':•Vagueness Doctrine in

See generally Amsterdam, The

!M Supreme Court, 109 u.:Pa. L. Rev. 67 (1960);

Comment, 'the First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, S3 Harv. L• .r,ev. 044 (1970).
It is often observed that the so-called vagueness doctrine is a combination of overlapping, but distinct concepts reflecting different constitu•
tional principles, vagueness or indefiniteness, and overbreadth:
1.

Vafilleness

The concept of vagueness or indefiniteness rests on the constitutional
principle that procedural due process requires fair notice and proper stand•
ards fox adjudication.

The primary issues involved are whether the provisions
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of a penal statute are sufficiently definite to give reasonable notice of the
prohibited conduct to persons uho uish to avoid its penalties and to apprise
judge and

jury

of standards for the determination of guilt.

Landry v. Baley,

(1968) 280 F. Supp. 93C, 951 (tt.D. Ill.); ColliDS';,e, Unconstitutional Uncertainty-An Appraisal, 40 Cornell L. Rev. 195 (1955).

If the statute 19 so

obscure that men of comm.on intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning
and differ as to its applicability, it is unconstitutional.

!e,gget v. Bullitt

(1964) 377 U.S. 36U, C4 S. Ct.·1316;12 L. Ed. 2d 377; Lanzetta v. ~Jersey,
(19.39) 306 U.S. 451, 453. ..59 S. Ct. 610, G3 L. Ed. 880; ConnallI v. General
Construction Co.~ (1926) 269 U.S. 305, 391 46 S. Ct. 126~ 70, L~ Ed. 322. ·
This Court recently has stated the test as follcx·1s:
[A] statute :ts not unconstitut:lonal by re·ason of ind~finit:~n~sa if
it is capable of intelligent construction and interpretation by par•
sons ·who possess but ordinary comprehension, if its language conveys aa
adequate description of the evil intended to be prohibitcd.u
st

Stanley v·. State (1969), ___ Ind.
11

____ , 245 N.E.2d 149, 152.

However,

the freedom. 0£ speech and of the press which are secured by the First.

Amendment against abridgment by the United States, are among the fundamental
personal rights and liberties ,1hich are secured to all persons by the
Fourteenth Amendment against abridgment by a State. 11 Thornhill v. Alabama,
(1940) 310 U.S. 3C, 95, 60 S. Ct. 736, 740, 84 L. Ed. 1093.

The Supreme

Court of the United States time and again has admonished state legislatures and
courts that

0

standards of permissible statutory vagueness are strict in the

area of free ez.pression."

See, e.g., Keyishian v. Board

305 U.S. 589, 604, 87 ~. Ct. 675, 604, 17 L. Ed. 2d 629.

2£.

Resents, (1967)

Since Section

10-4533 quite obviously threatens free speech, association, and assembly
it must meet these strict standards of specificity or be found unconstitutional on its face.

10

2 "·.- Over5readth

In a recent case before a three judge panel in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Judge ~ill accurately and
succinctly described the overbreadth aspect of the void for vagueness doctrine:
"The concept of overbreadth • • • rests on principles of substantive
due process which forbid the prohibition of certain individual freedom. The primary issu~ ls not reasonable notice or adequate standards.)
although these issues may be involved. Rather t~e issue is whether the
la uage of the statute, given its normal meanin is so broad that
·ts sanctions ma app y to con uct rotected b the Constitution.
\ Frequently, tu~ reso ut on of this issue depends upon whether the
statute permits police and other offictals to wield unlimited discretion~~l
tn its enForcement. [citations omitted) If the
scope of the power permitted these officias ie so broad that the ·.
exercise of constitutionally protected conduct depends oa their own
subjective views aa to the propriety of the conduct, the statute is
unconstitutional."

powers

Land Iv. Daley9 sup~a at 951-52; Thornhill v. Alabama, supr~- at 97-98.
See also p~ent, 83 Harv. L. Rev •• sup!! at 052-58;· and authortties cited
therein.
:3.

!!!!, Prima!'.I

~

!!!. !.

Vague .2!: Overbrcad

Statute

!!. ill. Chilling

Effect U~ !h! Exercise~ First Amendment ~~ght!·
In summary. a penal statute is unconstitutional on its fac,.,.if it
(1) fails to give fair notice of what conduct is forbidden; (2) invites

arbitrary and discriminatory law enforcement; or (3) overreaches federally
protected freedoms of speech, free movement and assembly.

The combination

of these factors in a penal statute is sure to have a deterrent effect beyond
that necessary to fulfill any legitimate state interest.

Rather than chance

prosecution, citizens will tend to refraift\;from speech acd assembly that

might come within the ambit of the statute.

Dombrowski v. Pfister, (1965)

380 U.S. 479, 489-96,85 S. Ct. 1116i 14 L. Ed. 2d 22.

N.A.A.C.P. v.

Button, suEra at 432-33; Thornhill v. Alabama, supra at 97-98.
.. .
...

--

.

-

......

Su.ch a
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nchU 1 ing" effect upon the exerciee of these t'ights is impermissible under .• . ~.
the Fit'et Amendment, and the major reason for invalidating a substantially
overbroad la~ is to end its deterrence of constitution.ally preferred activit~:,
Dombrowski v. Pfister, supra at 494-96; N.A.A.C.P. v. Button. supra at 437;
Thornhill v. Alabama, supra at 101-06.
The First hnendment ,:•1as designed not only to protect the freedoms of
speech and assembly, but also to encourage their use.

Consequently, as with

the requirement of Jefioiteness. the requirement of permissibly narrow ecope
must be strictly observed when a statute places any possible limitation upon
First Amendment rights.

Landry v. Daley~ eugra at 952, citing ~eYj.ehian v.

Board of Regents, S¥Pra at 603•04;
551-52, 85

s.

~

v. Louisiana..i (1965) 379 U.S. 536,

Ct. 476, 13 L. Ed. 2d 487; Edwards v. South Carolina, (1963)

372 U.S. 229, 237•38, 83 S. Ct. 680, 9 L. Ed. 2d 697.

Such scrutiny is

necessary to provide a buffer between the valid exercise of the police power
by the state and excessive restriction of the free dissemination of tdeas.
"These freedoms are delicate and vulnerable., as
well as supremely precious in our society. The threat
of sanctions may deter their exerctse almost ag potently
as the actual application of sanctions . • • • Because
,,._,rst Amendment freedoms need breathing ~pace
surv!ye,
government may regulate 1JL.tbe area Qnly--l:litb.narrow
specificity."

to

N.A.A.C.P. v. Buttons s~r~ 371 U.S. at 433, 9 L. Ed. 2d at 418.
B.

Appellants May Challenge

lli

Facial Validity Ei. Section 10-4533

Whether~ l!2!. Their Particular Conduct Could Constitutionally!!_ Proscribed.
Before demonstrating hov the principles discussed above apply to
Section 10•4533, it should be emphasized that the appellants challenged the
facial validity of the statute at every stage of the proceedings in the
trtal court attd have presented the constitutionality of the statute as the

12
only issue on appeal.

It is well established that a person has standing to

challenge the facial validity of an indefinite and overbroad statute "1r1hen he
is ac-cus·ed of a violation of that statute whether or not his conduct could be
proscribed by a properly drawn law.

Comparing a broad penal statute pro

hibiting loitering and picketing with an unconstitutional licensing scheme
imposing prior restraints upon the freedom of speech and press, the United
States Supreme Court has observed:
"Proof e;;_ an abuse of power in the particular case
has never been deemed a requisite for attack on the
constitutionality of a statute purporting to license
the dissemination of ideas •.•. The power of the
license against which CTohll---l1ilton directed his assault
by his 'Appeal for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing'
is pernicious not merely by reason of the censure of
particular comnents but by reason of the threat to
censure connnents and matters of public concern. It
is not merely the sporadic abuse of power by the censor
that constitutes the danger to freedom of discussion ••
A like threat is inherent in a penal statute, like that
in question here, which does not aim specifically at
evils uithin the ai!owable area of state control but,
on the contrary, sweeps within its ambit other activities
that in ordina circumstances constitu e an exercise
of freedom of speech or of the press. The existence
of such a statute, which readily lends itself to harsh
and discriminatory enforcement by local prosecuting
officials, against particular groups deemed to merit
their displeasure, results in a continuous and pervasive
restraint on all freedom of discussion that ight
reasonably be regarded as within its purview.' It is
not any less effective or, if the restraint s not
permissible, less pernicious than the restraint on
freedom of discussion imposed by the threat of censor
ship. An accused, after arrest and conviction under
such!! statute, does not have tosustain the burden
ofcemonstrating that the State could not constitutionally
have written!! different and spe�ific statute covering
his activities disclosed EX the charge and the evidence
introduced against him •••• Where regulations of the
liberty of free discussion !!'.£ concerned there �
special reasons !2E_ observing� rule that it is the
statute, and not the accusation or the evidence under
il, whichpremit;;'; the limits of �issible conduct
and warns against transgression." (Emphasis supplied.)

I
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Thornhill v. Alabama, supra, 310 U.S. at 97-98, 60 $.Ct.at 741-42.
In accord are N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, supra at 432; Freedman v. !1aryland, (1965)
300 U.S. 51~ 56. 85 S. Ct. 734, 13 L. Ed. 2d 649; cf. Dombrowski v. Pfister•
at 406-89; Kunz v.

gupra

19 L. Ed. 2d 444.

Nm~

York (1S51) 340 U.S. 290, 71 S. Ct. 312,

-~~~ Y•

~- t-

~
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As will be demonstrated below, Section 10-4533 lends itself to a
substantial number of impermissible applications overreaching First Amend•
tnent rights and ch,.lling the full and free exercise of those Tights by the
citizens of this State.

This Court should, therefore, declare the statute

unconstitutional on its face rather than attempting to e:cciee the unconstitutional applications of the statute on a case hy case basis.

With such a

broad statute the threat of unconstitutional application will never be removed
sufficiently.

ln his dissent from the decision of a majority of a three

judge panel to uphold a Mississippi anti-pic!:eting law. Judge Rives of the
United States Court of Appeals £or the Fl.fth Circuit observed:

11

The danger

to freedom of speech [from} a broad and vague delegation of power • • • is
too great to expose it to the long road of case-by-case litigation in the
hope that someday the statute's reach will be narrowed to constitutionally
permissible limits.° Cameron v. Johnson, (1966) 262 F. Supp, 873, 897, (S.D.Mi.ss
aff'd 2,!! other grounds, 390 U.S. 611,88 S. Ct. 1335• 20 L, Ed. 2d 102 (1968).
As stated in a recent and scholarly analysis of the overbreadth doctrine:
0

1n sum, piecemeal excision is not responsive to tll.e policy uhich
chiefly supports the overbreadth doctrine: the need for judicial
alacrity in dissipating the chilling effect of overbroad statutes,
The successful assertion of a claim of privilege by one member of
a class of privileged actors often does little to clarify for the
rest of the class the scope of protected activity. The necessity to
litigate-or rathe:t~ a structure of risks includiuc the possibility
of being put to a judicial test-is sometimes a tolerable condition
on the orderly exercise of rights. But the prospect of litigation
is a severe and persisting deterrent unless an occasional judicial
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test is eufficient to guarantee an overall probability of regularity
and to ex.elude the threat of overprohibitory decisionmakins in administration of linrs bearing upon firot amendn\ent activities. n
Comment.,~ First Amendment: OVerbreadth Doctrine, 03 ?:larv. L. Rev. 044.
870-71 (1970); see also, Dombrowski _v. Pfister. supra at 4C6•t7.

C. Section 10•4533 Threatens First lunendment Rights in_!! Substantial
Number

.2£. l-1aye.

The follO"Wing elements constitute the offense under Section 10-4533:
1.

A pe .. son must be on the premises of an "institution estab•

lisbed for the purpose of the education of students enrolled therein;"
2.

He must be requested to leave those premises;

3.

By the duly constituted officials "of any such institution;"

4.

Who may demand compliance with such a request "regardless of

the reason:u and
5.

He must refuse to leave such prernises.

This law applies to "any person° and therefore to duly enrolled scudents,
faculty, administrators. employees and all other visitors (iovited as well
as uninvited) upon the premises of an educational institution in this state.
The term "premises" is not defined and would appear to encompass not only
classroom and office buildinas, but areas of state supported universities,
colleges and schools that are generally open to the public.

Since the statute

penalizes a person's refusal to leave the premises of any educational in•
stitution in this state t-1hen requested "regardless of the reason~" it is
clear that the statute could be invoked £or reasons incompatible with the
First Amendment.

If a student, tencher, employee or visitor stands upon

his right to stay where he has a lawful right to be, he risks arrest, prose•
cution, six months in jail, and a fine of $500.00.

To be found guilty of a
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violation of Section 10-l~533 a person need not have created a disturbance on
the premises nor interfered in any way with the lawful use of the premises.
The statute simply, and impermissibly, subjects a citizen's presence on the
campus of a state university, college or other educational institution to
the unfettered whim of some undefined class of "duly constituted officials."
The affidavits in the instant case go even further and place such arbitrary
pm-1er in the hands of campus police officers.
Quite recentl~ a much more detailed Tennessee statute1 1 of the same
t!Elture was struck doun by a three judge panel of a United States District
Court.

Baxter v. EJlington, (1970) 313 F. Supp. 1079 (E.D. Tenn.).

Writ-

ing for the unanimous panel, Judge Taylor held:

"In general terms there are three elements in the statutory
offense: (1) presence at a school facility; (2) acts interfering,
or tending to interfere uith normal, orderly peaceful or efficient
conduct of the school facility; and (3) failure to leave the
facility when ordered to do so by an administrative official.
Apparently, the legislative intent was to endot-1 an official of the
university t·1 ith the power to disperse an unruly crowd or mob before
riotous proportions are reached. In that sense the statute is
analogous to statutes imposing prior res.traints on First Amendment
activities without defining the exact dimensions of the restraint.
E.g., Shuttlesy1orth v. Birmingham, 382 U. S. C7, 86 S. Ct. 211, 15
L. Ed. 2d 176 (1965). Little imagination is required to conceive of
acts interfering or tending to interfere lrl.th the normal, orderly,
peaceful or efficient,conduct of an educational facility which fall)
withi.n the protection of the First Amendment. An obvious danger is
that the administrator's hostility to the acts committed will influence his decisions. The entire ~tatute is vague and overbroad.
~ v. Louisiana. 379 U.S. 536, 551-52, CS S. Ct. 453, 13 L. Ed. 2d
471 (1965); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 22 9, 237-33, 33 S. Ct.
630, 9 L. Ed . 2d 697 (1963)." 318 F. Supp. at 1086.
11renn. Code Annot. §39-1215:
"Any person who enters the campus, buildings, or facilities of a junior
college, state university, or public school and is committing, or commits,
any act which interferes with, or tends to interfere with, the normal, orderly
peaceful, or efficient conduct of the activities of such campus or facility
may be directed by the chief administrative officer, or employee designated
by him to maintain order on such campus or facility, to leave such campus,
buildings, or facilities. If such person fails to do so, he shall be guilty
of trespass, and upon conviction shall be deemed guilty of, and punished as for~
a misdemeanor • • • • 11
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ln People v. Agnello, (l~~C) 259 Cal. App. 2d 705, 66 Cal ~ptr. 571,
the court, without addressing itself to the problet11 of overbreadth» upheld a
California statute (Hest' s Ann. Cal. Pen. Code, S602. 7. now 5626 •6 (1971
Sup\\)) similar to the Tennessee statute condemned in ]a1<.ter.

Even thoush

that decision seems quite erroneous inllght of the applicable constitutional
criteria, (see generally Comment,
of Access~ Nonstudents

lb!

University and The Public:

The Right

ll Universitx Property. 54 Calif. L. Rev. 132

(1966)), the Cali~~rnia statute differs significantly from Section 10-4533

in that it applies only to persons othe~ £!!!!! students, officers or employees
of a state college. or university.

Horeover, before aQy university official

can issue a direction to leave it must reasonably appear to him that the
person 11is committing soy act likely to interfere ·uith the peaceful conduct
of the activities of sucli campus or facility or has entered such campus or
facility for the purpose of committing any such act." But see Castro
v. Superior Court. (1970) 9 Cal. App. 3cl 644. 699•522, an Cal Rptr. 40C,
518-19, (holdine unconstitutional for overbreadth Heat's AM. Cal. Educ.

Code §16701 ·which provided:

..Any person ,1ho •uillfully disturbs any

public school or any public school meeting is guilty of a misdemeanor • • • • 11) .
1.

l'.,hfOUSh

~

~

Le3islature Ha~~ Control Access~~ Publicly Owned

Delegation 2!., Unlimited Power !£_ Administrative Officials.

Section 10-4533 amounts to a standaAess delegation of power to admin/t.

istrators of educational institutions to license, censor and prohibit the
eJ:ercise of the rights of free speech and assembly by

0

any person" on the

premises of any educational 'institution in this.state,. including colleges end
universities.

The constitutional infimity of such a delegation of power
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is beyond question:
"It is clearly unconstitutional to enable a public official to
determine which expressions of view will be permitted and which will
not or to engage in invidious discrirnination among persons or groups
either by use of a statute providing a system of broad discretionary
licensing power or, as in this case, the equivalent of s�h a S)'stem >
by select ive enforcement o= an extremely broad ...l).t:.ob.ihito,:y""sbtb.1:te-;J"
�v. Louisiana, (1965) 379 U.S. 536, SSC, 85 S. Ct. 453, 13 L. Ed. 2d 471.
In acco.:d

L. Ed.

are� v. Neu York, (1951) 340 U.S. 290, 71 S. Ct. 312, 95

.312 ·

(1951)

(state may not vest restraining control over the

right to speak on religious subjects in an administrative official where
there are no appropriate stands.rds to guide his actions); Staub v. City
of Ba�dey (195G) 355 U.S. 313, 322, 78 S. Ct. 277, 2 L. Ed. 2d 302:

"It

is settled by a long line of recent decisions of this Court that an ordinance
,1hich, like this one, makes the peaceful enjoyment of freedoms which the

Constitution guarantees contingent upon the uncontrolled in.11 of an official
as by requiring a permit or license which may be granted or uitheld in the
discretion of such official-is an unconstitutional prior restraint upon the
enjoyinent of those freedoms."
Recently federal courts have held unconstitutional similar standardless
delegations or assumptions of power by university administrators.

In

Brooks v. Auburn University, (1969) 412 F.2d 1171 (5th Ci!'.), a university
president sought to bar the appearance and speech on the Auburn campus of
the Reverend William Sloan Coffin.

His grounds for refusing to permit Rev•

erend Coffin to speak were that he uas a convicted felon and that he might
advocate breaking the law.
speaker eligibility.

Auburn had no rules or regulations governing

Noting that the First Amendment embraces the right

to hear as well as the right to speak, the court he ld unanimously that the

10
president• s a.ct ion "1as unconstitutional:
A.ttributing the highest good faith to Dr. Philpott in his

11

action, it nevertheless is clear under the prior ~estraint doctrine

that the right of the faculty and students to hear a speaker, selected
as was the speaker her~, eaMot be left to the discretion of t:he .
university president on a piel; and choose 'basis. As. stated, Auburn
had no r11les or -regulations as to who might or might not speak and
thus no question of a COl!lpliance with or a departure from. such rules
or regulations is presented. This left the matter as a pure First
A:mendment question; hence the basis for prior·restraint. Such .1
sltua.tion of no rules or regulations may be equated with a licensing
sygtem. to speak or bear and this las been long prohibited. Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 1940, 310 U.S. 276, 60 S. Ct. 900, 34 L. Ed. 1213."
412 F.2d at 1172•73.

~

The same approach ,-,as taken in Snyder v. Board of Trustees of the Univer-

sitI,_ of Illinois. (1%8)

206 F. Supp. 927 (N.D. Ill.), ·wherein a three

~~~~~~
~

~

judge panel declared unconstitutional an Illinois statute barr~ng the u s e ~ ~
of university facilities "to any subversive, aeditioue, and un•American

~)->-·

organization ••• for the purpose of carrying on, advertising or publiciz~<

the activities of such orsanization." Ill. l!ev. Stat., Ch. 1411, Sectioa
48.D.

~

The court noted that> apart from libel and obscenity, speech may be

suppressed only when it presents a clear and present daneer that substantive
evil will result.

286 'Ji'. Supp. at 933.

Quite recently the Supreme Court

of the United States has restated this test as follows:

"(CJonstitutional gt•arantees of free speech .and free press do
not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of th~ use of
force or of lat-1 violation exce t where such advoc:lcy is directed to
neftin or producing imminent lat1 ess ac:t1.on an is
to--1!£.!te
_
a ute w 1.c l ails to draw this
distinction impermissibly intrudes upon the freedom. guaranteed by
t!~ First and Fourteenth Amendments. It sweeps ~rithin its condemna,t;;ion speech which our Consittution has immunized from govermnental
ccni:rol. 0

J

Brandenburs v • .Qh!.2, (1969) 395 U.S. 444, 447-40, 89 S. Ct. 1027, 1029-30,
23 L. Ed. 2d 430.
There is no difference bett1een the prior licensing systems and incerferencE
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with free speech found to be unconstitutional in these decisions and the
unlimited discretion to control access to publicly owned university or school
property granted to adninistrators by Section 10-4533.

Pursuant to such

po'l.'1er an ac'!ministrator could request an iavited speaker to leave as soon
as he entered the campus or a1ehool building and have hiTil arrested if he
refused.

Ort the administrator could request the speaker to leave as soon

as be uttered an idea '\'r.lth which he did not agreei thereby depriving the
apealc.er of his ritf t: to speak and the audience of their right to hear.
Of course Section 10•4533 is much broader and more insidious than any
of the statutes condemned in any of the preceding cases.

It is broad

enou8h to permit an administrator to order a student who is duly enrolled
in the school, college or u~iversity to leave the pret?1ises for any reason,
or for no reason-perhaps because he t1as long hair, or is displaying a peace
symbol. or wearin8 a black anu band in symbolic protest against war, or is

engaged in peaceful picketing or leafleting.

All of these are constitution•

ally protected fot"lnS of expression and, when done in a peaceful and nondisruptive manner, cannot be interfered with either directly or indirectly
through threat of arreet,

l1oreover, the 5tatute is broad enough to pemit

an administrator, or even a campus policeman, to order a teacher from his
classroom under t:hreat of arrest because of disagreeaent with uh.at is said.
Just a year ago the United States Supreme Court eophasized that "First
Amendment rights~ applied in light of the special characteristics of the
school environment, are available to tesclters and students.

It can hardly

be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights
to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.•• Tinl:er v.
Des J,foine$ Indeeende.!1E 2~unity School District, (1969) 393 U.S. 503, 506,
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09 s. Ct. 733, 736, 21 L. Ed. 2d 731.

The Court went on to hold:

11 In order for the State in the person of school officials to
justify prohibition of a particular expression of opinion $ it must
be able to show that its action was caused by something more than
a mere desire to avoid the discorafort and unpleasantness that always
accompany an unpopular vie�7Point. Certainly where there is no finding
and no showing that engaging in the forbidden conduct uould 'materi:
ally and substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate
discipline in the operation of the school, the prohibition can�ot
be sustained� 1•11 393 U.S. at 509, 89 s. Ct. at 733.

If Section 10-!}533 is allot-red to stand, school a.dmini.strators or campus

policemen trl.11 be .:ermitted unfettered control of the content of speech and
the means of e,:pression of anyone on the premises.

All they need do is

request the speaker to leave and arrest him if he asserts a constitutional
right to remain.

11

0ne cannot be punished for failing to obey the command of

an officer if that command is itself violative o:f the Constitution."
L;'ovu. .. 1_

__.,_._.

Wright v. Georgia, (1963) 373 U.S. 2C4, 291-9Z 03 S. Ct. 12!!.0, 10 L. Ed. 2d
349.

See also Brown v. Louisiana, (1%6) 383 U.S. 131,138, 86 S. Ct. 719,

15 L. Ed. 2d 637, ("petitioners cannot constitutionally be convicted merely

because they did not comply with an order to leave the [public} library. 11)

The pervasive chilling effect upon the exercise First Amendment rights
produced by the power to declare anyone's presence on a university campus
or other school property unlawful is apparent.

The full, vigorous, and ro-

bust debate and exchange of ideas in the schools and colleges of this state
are now, due to Section 10-4533, dampened by the ever present threat of arrest.
The effect of this is to render unreviet1able significant violations of
First Amendment rights by school authorities.

A request to leave conditioned

upon the discontinuation of a protected form of expression (and backed by
threat of arrest in the event of refusal to desist) inevitably forces upon
the person exercising his right of free speech the choice of giving up that
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right or submitting to arrest.

Unless he is prepared to face the e�pensc

is
and notoriety of a criminal prosecution, hemust onivc in and his voice
stilled. Moreover, such acquiescence precludes any meaninsful judicial
determination of the legality of the administrntor's action.
Books, Inc. v. Sullivan
--

See Bantam

(1963) 372 U.S. Sq C3 S. Ct. 631, 9 L. Ed. 2d SCl:;

Freedman v. Maryland, (1965) 3C0 U.S. 51, S. Ct. 734, 13 L. Ed. 2d 649;
Commen�, 54 Calif. L. Rev. 132, 153-54 (1966).
2.

Access tv the Property ,Qf State Supported Universities, Colleges

and Public Schools May Not Be Controlled in the � Hanner as i\ccess to
Private Property
The State may not seel: to uphold the validity of Section 10-4533 on
the ground that access to public property may be controlled in the same
manner that an mmer may control access to private property.

This idea,

suggested by Justice Holmes I dictum in Commom-1eal th v. Davis, (1395) 162
Mass. 510, 39 N.E. 113, aff 1 d, 167 U.S. 43 (1C97), Has later repudiated by
l1r. Justice Roberts in Hague v. Corranittee for Industrial Organization, (1939)
307 U.S. 496, 515, 59 S. Ct. 954, 96l}, G3 L. Ed. 1423:

"Wherever the title of street and parl�s may rest, they have
immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and time
out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating
thoughts betueen citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use
of the streets and public places has from ancient times, been a part of
the privileges, immunities, rights and liberties of citizens."
This does not mean, and appellants do not suggest, that certain offi
cials may not be empowered to adjust the conflicting interests in our society
regarding the use of public areas for speech-related activities such as
demonstrations and parades, so long as those officials act within the framework of permissible standards and in an even-handed, non-discriminatory
manner.

In Cox v. New Hampshire, (1941) 312 U.S. 569, 61 S. Ct. 762, CS

22
L. Ed. 1049., it ,,ras

11

established that discretion in._grattting permits was

limited ex.elusively to considerations of time, place, and manner, and in
effect to the unbeatable proposition that you cannot have two parades on the
corner at the same time. 11 l{alven.
Ct. Rev. 1, 25.

~

Concept

2£ Sh! Public Forum,

1965 Sup.

This idea was further emphasized in.~ v. Louisiana, eup_ra,

uherein Mr. Justice Goldberg, deliverins the opinion of the Court, uttered
his famous dictum that "[tlhe riehts of free speech and assembly, ,~hile
fundamental in ou~· democratic society, still do not mean that everyone with
opinions or beliefs to e1:press may address a group at any public place and
at any time."

379 U.S. at 554, 35

s. Ct. at 464.

The question here. of course, is h0t1 these principles apply to the
control of the publicly ouned property of educational institutions rangin8
from grammar schools to large universities.

Again it must be emphasized

that Section 10-45.33 niakes no distinctions betueen students, faculty, employees and visitors to school property.

Neither does it make any distinc-

tion between areas held open to the public {e.g •• campus walks, buildings
such as the Indian.a. Memorial Union on the campus of Indiana University at
Bloomington, athletic facilities, auditoriums, theaters, art galleries,
libraries, parking lots, etc.), and areas that are intended for more restrict•
ive use (e.g •• classrooms, offices. laboratories. domitories. etc.).

Any

person may be ordered to leave the premises under pain of arrest for refusal
no matter whether he has invaded the office of the university president or
the high school principal, or whether he has settled peacefully and quietly in
his seat to listen to a lecture, hear an opera, or ·watch a game of basketball.
It is

not•7

clearly the law' th.at First Amendment rights may be exercised

in publicly-en-med places such as a park, Niemotko v. Marvland, (1951) 340

23
U.S. 268, 71 S. Ct. 325, 95 L. Ed. 267; the grounds of a state capitol.
Edwards v. South Carolina, supra; or a bus terminal, Wolin v. Port of New

X!?!!~ Authority,

(1968) 392 F.2d 33 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 940;

t

f

~.
1

and even in privately-owned places such as a company town, Marsh v. Alabama
(1946) 326 U.S. 50~66

s.

Ct. 226, 90 L. Ed. 265; or a shopping center,

Amalgamated~ Employees Union Local 12.Q. v. Logan Valley Plaza,
(1968) 391 U.S. 3O~ 08 S. Ct. 1601, 20 L. Ed. 2d 603.

1!!£..,

~-

Obviously those

areas of the camp: Jes of the state universities and colleges

7

and those of

other public schools, that are generally open to the public come within
the rationale of these cases.

See Tinker v. Des Moines !,ndependent Community

School District, -supra at 512-13; Hanunond v. South Carolina~- College,
(1960) 272 P. Supp. 947 (D. s.c.).

A similar rationale uould apply to

students, faculty and other authorized persons who may be located in non~
public areas of the campus, but where they have a right to be because of
their special status.
Since Section 10-4533 could se:cve to stifle all forms of protected
First Amendment activity (not to mention its potential for racial discri•
mination), it has already been authoritatively condemned by the Supreme
Court of the United States.
382 U.S. 8~ 06

s.

In Shuttlesworth v. City of Binningham, (1965)

Ct. 211, 15 L. Ed. 2d 176, the Court examined an ordinance

making it "unlawful for any person to stand or loiter upon any street or
side,;-1alk • • • after having been requested by any police officer to move on."
Writing for the Court, Mr. Justice Stewart observed:
''Literally read, therefore, the second part of this ordinance
says that a person may stan.rl on a public sidew,dk in Birmingham
only at the whim of any police officer of that city, The Constitutional
vice of so broad a provision needs no demonstration. It ~oes not
provide for goverrnnent by clearly defined la,;·rs, but rather for

/
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govermnent by the moment--to..moment opinions of a p·ol iceman on his
beat' [citation omitted). Instinct t-:1ith its ever-pres~nt potential
for arbitrarily suppressing J:l'irst J>..mendment liberties, that kind of
lan bears the hallti1ar!; of a police state." 332 U.S. at 90, 86 S. Ct.
at 213.
See also Johnson v. Virginia, (1963) 373 U.S. 61, 03 S. Ct. 1053, 10 L. Ed. ·

7.cr

195; l·Jright v'!-.

Georgill,

(1963) 373

u.s.

L. Ed. 2d 349; Brotm v. Louisiana, supra.

284,. 03

s.

Ct. 1240, 10

Literally read, Section 10-4533

says that a person, be he student, teacher or visitor, may remain on public
university or sch. -,1 property only at the 1-ihim of some administrator (or,
as in the instant case, a campus police officer).

The constitutional vice

of so broad a provision has been demonstrated above.
In the trial court the State

relied heavily upon Adderly v. Florida,

(1966) 385 U.S. 3~ 07 S. Ct. 242, 17 L. Ed. 2d 149, in which the Court upheld

trespass convictions of several students who staged a demonstration on the
premises of the county jail protesting the arrest 0£ some fellow students and
state and local policies of racial segregation.

The Court noted that although

the jail and the jailhouse grounds uere publicly ouned, the jail vas built

-----------

for security purposes and was not open to the pubU.£:.

The Court found that

the Florida trespass statute, wh1.ch was held not to be void for vagueness, 21
could be applied to the petitioners ~,ho had refused to leave the jail property when· requested.,:. The Court reasoned that the State hacl "pouer to preserve
the property under its control for the use to which it is laufully dedicated."
385 U.S. at 47.
2 1unlit,e Section 10-4533, the Flortda stat1Jte was reasonably specific:
"Every trespass(upon the property of another,) committed with a maliciou~
) .!!l!_schiAnt.oua intent, the punishment of which is not specially provided for»
shall be punished by imprisonment not exceeding three months, or by fine not
exceedinJJ one hundred doll.s.ra." Fla. Stat. ~C21.1G (196~).
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Adderly merely stands for the proposition, already established, that
certain forms of expression may be out of place in a particular setting
and can, given a properly drawn statute, be controlled if the applicable
law is applied in a reasonable and non--discriminatory manner,

Adderly cannot

be read to empower a state to exercise arbitrary control over college cam•
puses and public school buildings.
like a jail or a hospital.

A university, college or school is not

11

lt is a public place, and its dedication to

specific uses doe~ not imply that the constitutional richts of persons entit\_sd
to be there are to be gauged as if the premises were purely private propertz."
Tink~r v. Des Hoines Independent Community, School Dist., supra, 393 U.S.
at 512 n.6.

Also in Tinker, the Court held:

11

A student's rights, therefore, do not embrace merely the classroom hours~- :·'hen he is in the cafeteria, or on the.playing field or
on the campus during the authorized hours, he may express his opinions,
even on controversial subjects like the con!lict in Vietnam, if he
does so without materially and substantially interfer[ingJ with the
requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the sch~ol
and ·without colliding ln.th the rights of others." 393 U.S. at 512-13,
09 S. Ct, at 741.
Cf. Amalgamated~ F.mployees Local 12.Q. v. Logan Valley Plaza, supra.

See \

also Kiislcila v. Nichols, (1970) 433 F,2d 745 (7th Cir.); Dash v. Commanding
General, .f.2!.t Jackson, (1969) 307 F. Supp. 049, 857 (D.S,C.), aff 1 d, 429
F .2d 427 (1970).
Obviously, a school or university is not obliged to tolerate unreasonable interference l·1ith its normal activities.

However, the nature of the

university or public school, and the pattern of its nonnal activity
dictate the kinds of regulations of time, place, and manner that are reason•
able.

See generally, Hright, The Constitution

1027, 1037-59 (1969); Comment. 54 Calif. L.

~

Campus, 22 Vand. L. Rev.

r.P. 132 (1966).

Since Section 10-4533 provides no standards uhatsoever, and is capable
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of being applied in

th e

context of "pure speech 11 a s wel l as to parade s ,

picketing and demonstrations whic h, themselv es, can be made

s ubjec t

only to

reas onabl e regulat ions non-di s crim�ily applied ( s ee Hright, s u pra and
authorities cited therein), it m u st be declared

void

for overbreadth .

Section l0•l!-533 :lis Unconst it u t ional -�ecause It 'is So Vague and 'In

·n.

definit e That·� of Common Int ell igence Must Necessarily Guess at
ing and . Differ � �

lli AE,Pl ication

Section 10-l�.:33 is

v ery

short, but far from simple.

the stat ute con tain a maze of

u

ncer tainties in wh ich

it s application are bound to get

l ost .

a ll

lli Mean-

The fou r lines of
concerned uith

u s l y, the statute c annot �n
...:O::..:b::..:v::..:1.·:.o
:. .:... :. :. � -=..:.: :..::_::_...::....::.:..::..::..::...: :__::."" :c==... "--

If, as here,

all of t he conduc t which on i ts face it appears to condemn.

a statute is patentl y ov erbroad when read at full li teral breadth, lack of
certainty arise s when a man of ordinary intelligence

t ries to

gue s s not

the literal scope but the permissibl e scope of its application.
ample, 't·1hen does it authorize "duly consti t ut ed
or requests to

l ea v e the

obey or comply?

c itizen t o

If it be ass u med that the statut e req u ires obedience only to
t hat

group of officials to require citizens to
they

to issue orders

"premises," and Hh en does it oblige a

lawful "request s," and assuming f u rther
or

officials"

For ex

it empowers some official

l eav e

or

public property onl y when

he

can do so constit u tionall y, the effect of the statute is to make a

ci tizen guess, under threat

of

crimina l penalty, the boundaries of his

constitutional right to make use of stat e-s u ppor t ed educat ional instit u tions.
Hhat is meant by "premises" of an educational institution?
of Indiana University at Bl oomington and of

other

sta t e-supported educa tional

instit utions spread ov er many hundreds of acres of land.
is

asked

The premises

When a person

or orderd to leav e such "premises" by "d u ly constit u ted officials"
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of the institution, how :car r.mst he go to avoid committing a crime?

Is

it enough to move out of the immediate building, halh1ay, room or other

specifically described area, or must he remove himself completely from the

campus.? When, and under uhat conditions, may he return? 31 The need for

· apparent •
an unacceptable amount o.:. guess,-,orl� is
.1:

"'·�1To one may be required

at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of

penal statutes.

All are entitled to be informed as to �-,hat the State connnands

or forbids." Lanzetta v. New Jersey, (1939) 306 U.S. L�Sl, L•53, 59 S. Ct.

610, 83 L.Ed. 808.

Thus, it appears that an overbroad lau such as Section 10-4533 which

covers First Amendment activities and provides no standards of First Amend•

ment privilege is at the same time vague and indefinite even though, on the

surface, it may appear rather specific.

This interrelationship of the two

aspects of the vagueness doctrine has been summarized admirably as follows:

''The [United States Supreme] Court often uses the idioms of
due process vagueness and first amendment overbreadth interchangeably.
Both doctrines are responsive to the fact that precision and predict
ability of governmental intervention are vital to persons planning
the exercise of fundamental rights. Both vague and overbroad statutes
covering first amendment activities tend to deter privileged conduct.
These facts should not be thought to exclude any independent concern
for statutory failure to give fair warning of coverage quite apart from
the possibility of first amendment overbreadth. But when analysis is
pressed beyond the point of asking whether the bare terms of a law
appear vague or overbroad, and is focused on the judicial process
l necessary to cure either statutory vagueness or statutory overbreadth,
the two constitutional vices appear in practice to merge. If a
vague statute is not held bad on its face, it is remitted to a proc�ss
of hammering out the limits of intervention under the impact of particular fact situations in the expectation that over time a core of
definite coverage will take shape by accretion. But a prolonged
and costly process of bringing clarity to statutory commands, like the
uncertain process of case by case excision, holds preferred freedoms in

31For other illustrations of the vagueness of Section 10-4533 see
Defendclllt's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Quash, pp. 8-10, Record
pp. 11-13.

') ....
....
u

abeyance for an indefinite period and toleLates the intimidation of
protected activity caused by a lat·1 uhose (literal or permissible)
scope is uncertain. Thus the doctrines of vagueness and overbreadth
supply identical considerations militating against piecemeal judicial
rehabilitation of statutes ,:-,hen preferred rights are at stake. 11
Comment, C3 Harv. L. llev. Cl:-4, G74-75 (1970) (footnotes omitted).
E.

Section 10-l}533 Is Not Subject to � J.,imiting Construction� Can

� Applied to the Appellants
Enoush has been ,-rritten above to demonstrate that it is impossible,
uithin the context. of a single case, to place upon Section 10-l}533
a construction that would satisfy the requirements of the Constitution.
Even ,-,ere this to be possible, any such construction would :require a
complete judicial rewriting of the statute to provide permissible standards
for the e2�ercise of administrative discretion in the control of persons
on the property of public educational institutions.

Such standards neces

sarily would have to contemplate differences between types and uses of pub
lic property and among persons asserting rights to be and remain on such
premises.

Any such judicially re,-,ritten statute would be � post facto inso

far as the appellants are concerned, and their convictions could not stand.
Bouie v. Columbia, (1964) 370 U.S. 347, 84 S. Ct. 1697, 12 L. Ed. 2d 894.
II.

THE LEGISLATURE HAS PROVIDED ADEQUATE TOOLS FOR THE CONTROL OF DISORDERS
ON CAMPUSES AlilD IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS HITHOUT NEED TO RESORT TO VAGUE

AND OVERBROAD STATUTES SUCH AS SECTION 10-4533
In a recent address to th,e American Lau Institute, Chief Justice Harren
Burger observed:

"In those few per5.ods of our history when we suspended

basic guarantees of the individual in times of great national emergency, we
often found, in retrospect, that we had overreacted."

Although the level of

campus dissent in this state could hardly be said to have reached emergency
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proportions in 1969, nevertheless the Indiana General Assembly reacted with
0

-

An A<::t to Prevent Trespassing Upon Public Property and Fixing Penalties."

Acts 1969. ch. 179.

The various s~ctions of that ~t appear as separate sta"

tutes in Burns Ind. Stat. Ann. ~G 10-4531-10-4536 (1970 Supp.).

Three
c---se.ctions of the act refer to more or less specific leeislative concerns:
intentional damase to property of an edueational institution (510-4531);
intentional interference with lawful use by others of the property of an
educational insti'•ltion (Ql0-4532); intentional interference with the la~ful use by others of public buildin3s (510-4534).

These sections are not

without their own problems of vazueness and overbre.adth, and they duplicate
pre-existing criminal statutes.

See, e.g., Durne Ind. Stat. Ann. 510-4507

(trespass on public grounds); Burns Ind. Stat. Ann. 510-4509 (malicious
trespass);

Burns lnd. Stat. Ann. 510-1510 (disorderly conduct).

These

statutes are listed by the Attorney General alont3 with forty-five other
sections of the criminal code which, in his opinion, are applicable to
sanction the unlat:,ful conduce of dissideote on college and university cax::,.puses.

1969 Op. Ind. Atc'y Gen. 15, 21.

Ho-rcover, the Boards of Trustees

of the various state universities are emponered "to Bovern, !?,x specific
re&ulatio9 and other lauful 1Ueans, the conduct of students, faculty, employees,
and others uhi le upon the property °'·med by or used or occupied by the in,

------ -----··- ··- Burns Ind. Stat. i\.nn. 520-5792a (b) (Supp. 1970) (pmphasis
(_
·~"'
~'-.~~
~t\'t-L ¼ ~ ' - ~ ¼"'-✓. l--,\£1-,1~·
supplied).~ See sosl~n v. Kauffman, (1()69) 410 F.2d 163_ (7th Cir.).
~-r
···--.

'-lstitution. u

..

.

.

'
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Put in this context, it is obvious that Section 10-4533 is a general
catch-all section that does not reflect any legitimate state interest.
Those interests, i.e., the protection of state property and the protection
of the lawful right of use of such property by others, .are reflected in
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numerous

specific provisions of the state's cri minal code and· through the

legislative power delegated to the governing boards of public educational
institutions.

Section 10-4533 adds nothing, but tal:es away the rights of

free speech and essembly guaranteed to all by the Constitution of the State
of Indiana and by the Constitution of the United States.
Conclusion
Because Sect:>n 10-4533 is so clearly vague and overly broad in light
of the controlling precedents discussed above, this Court is urged to de
clare the statute void on its face and to order that the convictions
the appellants be reversed.
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